The Hawks really have no value without the Gripens, if you get rid of the one you might as well ditch the other. But leaving the SAAF without a fighter capability is quite unthinkable.
The saner option, IMHO, would be to reduce the SANDF commitment to Africa to being no more than 2 reinforced battalions maximum as a hard limit and reduce the size of the standing army. That'll free up a ton of money.
The only long-term fix is to get the structure to a point where the cost of personnel is no higher than 40% of the budget, with 30% spent on operations and the other 30% on acquisitions. This is going to require a combination of a higher budget, drastic changes within the SANDF including a total overhaul of its HR policies and the willingness to demobilise those soldiers no longer contributing value.
I re-read the 1998 Defence Review again recently. What I found very interesting was the authors' statement that the force design they were recommending was, at the time, unaffordable, but that it would become affordable within the next few years as the SANDF personnel profile was fixed in line with stated SANDF policy:
Quote:
9. The affordability of the force design, which is central to its implementation, is subject to certain assumptions and qualifications. The long-term sustainability of the design requires a continuous investment in the periodic upgrading and replacement of equipment. The costing of the design thus incorporates annualised upgrade and replacement costs over the life span of the equipment. This is based on realistic assumptions, under present conditions, of the anticipated life span and cost of such equipment. Since the life span of major equipment is measured in decades and many replacement projects will commence many years hence, it is impossible to predict with absolute accuracy the actual annualised cost of equipment.
10. The process further assumes that the current imbalance in the so-called "tooth-to-tail ratio" of the SANDF will be corrected by the transformation process, thus releasing a greater portion of the budget for combat capabilities. The ratio on which the calculations are based is an estimate of the anticipated result of transformation.
It also reminded me that the government had committed to keeping the defence budget at or around 1.5% of GDP as a baseline, even though the actual figure has been at around 1%-1.2% since then, and how ambitious even the less-preferred force design was.
I wrote about this very topic in this month's FlightCom/SA Flyer, if anyone's interested, but in short the SAAF of today lacks many of the capabilities seen as being absolutely non-negotiable core capabilities in the more affordable Option 2 of the 1998 Defence Review. Most importantly, it's missing medium range maritime patrol aircraft, aerial refueling and EW aircraft.
As I said before, this country's civilian leadership fundamentally does not understand defence.